Model Card — AegisGate Threat Detector v11b
This model card follows the ML Model Card framework (Mitchell et al., 2019) and provides transparency into the AegisGate threat detection model.
Model Details
| Field | Value |
|---|
| Model name | AegisGate Threat Detector v11b |
| Model type | Character CNN-BiLSTM with Attention |
| Version | 11b (char-cnn-bilstm-v11b) |
| Release date | 2026-09-09 |
| License | Apache 2.0 |
| Parameters | 1,596,034 |
| Input | Character-level, 256 chars max, Latin-1 vocabulary (256 tokens) |
| Model size | ~6.1MB ONNX (float32), ~3.75MB JSON (float16 for Lens) |
| Inference latency | <1ms CPU (ONNX Runtime, Go), ~5-50ms (pure JS, Chrome V8) |
| Training framework | PyTorch → ONNX export (opset 18) |
Intended Use
- Primary use: Detect adversarial AI threats mapped to the MITRE ATLAS framework in HTTP API requests, MCP tool calls, A2A inter-agent communication, and AI responses
- Primary users: Security engineers deploying AI systems in production
- Out of scope: Not a general-purpose text classifier. Not for content moderation outside the AI threat domain. Not a replacement for human security review.
Training Data
| Source | Samples | Type |
|---|
| Alpaca (cleaned) | 19,993 | Benign |
| AGNews | 9,974 | Benign |
| Dolly-15k | 9,849 | Benign |
| OpenOrca | 9,593 | Benign |
| ATLAS augmented | 2,168 | Adversarial |
| Prompt injection (DAN) | 2,000 | Adversarial |
| Data leakage synthetic | 2,209 | Adversarial |
| Benign evasion-transformed | 2,219 | Benign |
| Targeted v3 | 1,254 | Adversarial |
| ToxiGen | 999 | Adversarial |
| v9 exfiltration | 900 | Adversarial |
| TruthfulQA | 797 | Benign |
| HH-RLHF (red team) | 494 | Adversarial |
| Security education | 517 | Benign |
| WikiText | 409 | Benign |
| Prompt injection (various) | ~1,905 | Adversarial |
| Other | ~2,892 | Mixed |
| Total | 70,572 | |
- Split: 80% train (56,457) / 10% val (7,057) / 10% test (7,058)
- Data collection: All synthetic or publicly available datasets. No real user data. Seeds derived from publicly documented ATLAS techniques.
- Augmentation: 52 ATLAS payload seeds × 50 transforms (character substitution, encoding, linguistic, whitespace, fragmentation)
- Preprocessing: Character-level normalization to Latin-1 (PAD=0, UNK=1)
Evaluation Metrics
Test Set Results (held-out 10%)
| Metric | Value |
|---|
| Accuracy | 98.27% |
| Precision | 97.71% |
| Recall (TPR) | 94.49% (1,492/1,579 detected) |
| F1 Score | 96.07% |
| False Positive Rate | 0.64% (35/5,479 benign flagged) |
| False Negative Rate | 5.51% (87 missed) |
Confusion Matrix: TP=1,492, FP=35, FN=87, TN=5,444
Evasion Suite Results
| Metric | Value |
|---|
| Evasion test suite | 2,600 tests (52 ATLAS payloads × 50 transforms) |
| Layered score (L1+L2+L3) | 99.8/100 |
| In-scope misses | 0 |
Model Integrity
| Format | SHA-256 |
|---|
| ONNX (float32, Platform/Rampart) | 8e13c793c32816aa0f6e2af13ffadd4f38f707b4ac8906b56ddfa77da51ea8e5 |
| JSON weights (float16, Lens) | c09eef58c79928bb6ff19bcd155da34ee1809c0ff0165d1afd6b049b400615d7 |
The platform verifies the model hash at load time. If the hash does not match, the model is rejected and the system falls back to heuristic detection.
Limitations
- Character-level model: Cannot detect semantic-level attacks that don’t manifest as character patterns
- Latin-1 vocabulary: Non-Latin scripts (CJK, Arabic, Cyrillic) map to UNK — handled by the Unicode homoglyph detector, not the model
- Synthetic training data: Real-world performance may differ; shadow mode is recommended for the first 7 days
- Heuristic fallback: Covers obfuscated/l33tspeak variants the model may miss — the layered architecture (L1 regex + L2 ATLAS/compliance + L3 ML) provides defense in depth
Ethical Considerations
- No user profiling: The model detects attack patterns, not attackers. It should not be used for user profiling or discrimination
- False positive management: 0.64% FPR on test set. CalibrationManager provides zero-FPR threshold tuning. Shadow mode provides a safety net
- No real user data: Training uses only synthetic and public datasets
- Transparency: This model card, the architecture, training methodology, and evaluation metrics are published openly
Deployment Configuration
# aegisgate-platform.yaml
ml_threat_detection_enabled: true
ml_shadow_mode: true # Log-only for first 7 days
ml_threshold: 0.50 # Calibrated for 0% FPR on benign corpus
ml_model_path: "pkg/ml/models/threat_cnn_bilstm.onnx"
ml_model_hash: "8e13c793c32816aa0f6e2af13ffadd4f38f707b4ac8906b56ddfa77da51ea8e5"
Graceful Degradation
When ML is disabled or ONNX runtime is unavailable:
- Heuristic detection maintains coverage with 0% FPR
- Regex patterns (L1) and ATLAS/compliance checks (L2) remain active
- The system never fails open — if the ML model cannot load, the system continues protecting with L1+L2
A/B Testing
AegisGate includes a built-in A/B testing framework for comparing model variants:
# Create test
curl -X POST -H "X-API-Key: your-key" -d '{
"name": "v11b-vs-v12",
"variants": [
{"name": "champion", "weight": 90, "model_ref": "model-v11b"},
{"name": "challenger", "weight": 10, "model_ref": "model-v12"}
]
}' https://aegisgate.yourcompany.com/api/v1/abtest/tests
# Start, monitor metrics, promote winner
Version History
| Version | Date | Key Changes | Test F1 | Test FPR |
|---|
| v9 | 2026-09-08 | Initial ATLAS-focused training, 66K samples | 95.5% | 0.7% |
| v11 | 2026-09-09 | Expanded corpus to 70K, added evasion augmentation | 96.0% | 0.7% |
| v11b | 2026-09-09 | Final calibration, 99.8/100 layered evasion score | 96.07% | 0.64% |
Citation
AegisGate Platform v4.4.1
Char CNN-BiLSTM with Attention — Threat Detection Model v11b
Apache License 2.0
https://github.com/aegisgatesecurity/aegisgate-platform